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Whalen: Docking of the Longshoremens' and Harbor Workers' Compensation Ac

NOTES
THE DOCKING OF THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND
HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT:
HOW FAR CAN IT COME ASHORE?*
INTRODUCTION

Maritime employment, in general, and longshoring, in particular, have long
been recognized as unusually hazardous occupations because of the dangers
inherent in handling unwieldy cargo within the confining spaces on and
around ships. This reputation is substantiated by records indicating that in
the United States during fiscal year 1971, there were 68,464 reported injuries
involving longshoremen., Of these, 29,006 arose in port cities within the Fifth
Circuit; and in Florida alone, 1,873 injuries were recorded.2 The longshoremen's disabling injury rate for 1969 was almost five times the national average
for manufacturing operations. 3 Thus, the need to provide immediate and
certain relief is even greater for injured longshoremen than for other workers.
In 1972 Congress made several far-reaching changes in the special compensation program designed for these maritime workers. This note will examine
the courts' interpretations of those sections that extended the coverage of the
federal compensation act inland from its original shoreline boundary.
HIsToRY OF THE ACT

Initially, compensation benefits for longshoremen were provided through
state workmen's compensation laws. 4 Voluntary compliance with this procedure ended in 1917 with Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,5 in which the
Supreme Court held the New York state workmen's compensation statute unconstitutional as applied to a longshoreman fatally injured on a gangway
connecting a vessel with a pier. The majority based its decision primarily on
the need for a uniform system of general maritime law, 6 concluding that
*EorroR's NOTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize
for the best note submitted in the Spring 1977 quarter.
1. Letter from the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration,
Office of Workmen's Compensation Programs, to the Committee on Education and Labor,
House of Representatives (1972).
2. Id.
3. Letter from the employer -members of the New York Shipping Association to
Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives (1972).
4. IA BENEDICr ON ADMIALTY, ch. 1, §2 (7th ed. E. Jhiral 1977).

5. 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (5-4 decision).
6. The majority opinion included three other reasons for disallowing coverage under
the state compensation statute. First, the Court noted an analogous rule respecting
Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. "Where the subject is national in its
character, and admits and requires uniformity of regulation, affecting alike all the
States, such as transportation between the States, including the importation of goods from
one State to another, Congress can alone act upon it and provide the needed regulations.
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uniformity would be weakened if ships were subjected to the states' individual
workmen's compensation laws.7
The same year Congress attempted to return state act coverage to maritime
workers by amending the "saving to suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act. s The
amendment, which saved "to claimants the rights and remedies under the
Workmen's Compensation Law of any state,"9 was immediately struck down
by the Supreme Court as an unconstitutional delegation to the states of power
over a subject entrusted exclusively to federal regulation.1 As in Jensen, the
Court viewed the attempted delegation as a threat to the uniformity of maritime law.12
After this setback Congress again amended the "saving to suitors" clause;
but, in an effort to preserve uniformity in maritime law, Congress redefined the
class of affected workers. Thus, the 1922 amendment expressly excluded from
coverage the "master or members of the crew of a vessel.'1 Even as limited,
however, the delegation was held unconstitutional two years later in Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co.14 In Dawson the Court finally suggested an
acceptable legislative alternative:

Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend, or revise the
maritime law by statutes of general application embodying its will and
judgment. This power, we think, would permit enactment of a general
Employers' Liability Law or general provisions for compensating injured employees; but it may not be delegated to the several states. The
grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction looks to uniformity; otherwise, wide discretion is left to Congress. 15

The absence of any law of Congress on the subject is equivalent to its declaration that
commerce in that matter shall be free." Id. at 217. Next, the majority argued that the
state's jurisdiction could not arise under the Judiciary Act's "saving to suitors" clause
since "[t]he remedy which the Compensation Statute attempts to give is of a character
wholly unknown to the common law, incapable of enforcement by the ordinary processes
of any court and is not saved to suitors from the grant of exclusive jurisdiction." Id. at 218.

Finally, the majority found that such coverage was inconsistent with the policy of
Congress to encourage investments in ships. Id.
7. Citing The Loftawanna, (Rodd v. Heartt) 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1875), as the
basis for the uniformity doctrine, the majority concluded: "And plainly, we think, no
such legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of
Congress or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime
law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international

and interstate relations." 244 U.S. at 216.
8. The Act gave district courts exclusive admiralty jurisdiction, "saving to suitors, in
all cases, the right of a common-law remedy, where the common law is competent to
give it." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §9, 1 Stat. 76 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C.

§1333
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

(1970)).
Act of October 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395 (1917) (held unconstitutional 1919).
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1919).
Id. at 164.
Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634 (1922) (held unconstitutional 1924).
Id.
264 U.S. 219 (1924).
Id. at 227-28.
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Thereupon, Congress directed its efforts toward the promulgation of a maritime workers' compensation act.
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act1 6 was passed
by Congress in 1927 and subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court.17 Since
Congress had intended that the Act only fill the voids left by the Court
decisions denying state workmen's compensation remedies to maritime
workers,' 8 coverage was limited to those employees (1) whose injuries occurred
upon navigable waters, and (2) for whom "recovery ... may not validly be
provided by state law."' 9
Had the provision that the injury occur upon navigable waters been the
sole requirement, its ease of application would have resulted in certainty of
coverage without the expense and delay of litigation. Even under a simple
navigable waters test, however, benefits would be fortuitously controlled by
the side of the shoreline on which the worker was injured. Larson, in his
treatise on workmen's compensation, 20 demonstrated the inequities of this
procedure by examining two early Supreme Court cases, T. Smith & Son, Inc.
v. Taylor2 ' and Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co. 2 ? In Taylor, decided in
1927, a longshoreman standing on a dock was struck by a crane operated
from a vessel and knocked into the water. The Court allowed state compensation because the impact occurred on land. Seven years later in Minnie, a
workman, who while aboard a vessel was knocked onto land by a land-based
crane, was denied state compensation because the impact occurred over navigable water.
Neither the type of work performed nor the risk of injury to the employee
was considered by the courts in applying the navigable waters test. Thus,
two employees injured while performing identical tasks would be compensated
differently if one had been standing on a gangway and the other on the
deck of a vessel only a few feet away. Since many employees spent much of
their workday crossing back and forth over this imaginary line, they were
continuously passing into and out of the Act's coverage.
In the 1969 decision of Nacirema Operating Go. v. Johnson,23 a case
16. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§901-950 (Supp. II 1972)).
17. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
18. Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U.S. 244, 250 (1941); Bassett v. Massman Constr.
Co., 1?0 F.2d 230, 233 (8th Cir. 1941) (citing 67 CONG. REc. 10,614 (1925)).
19. The original §903(a) read: "Compensation shall be payable under this chapter
in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death
results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including
any dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation
proceedings may not validly be provided by State law. No compensation shall be payable
in respect of the disability or death of - (1) A master or member of a crew of any vessel,

nor any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under
eighteen tons net; or (2) An officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof
or of any State or foreign government, or of any political subdivision thereof." 33 U.S.C.
§903(a) (1927) (as amended 1972).
20. See 4 A.

LARsON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw,

§89.23(a) (1976 & Supp. 1977).

21. 276 U.S. 179 (1928).
22. 295 U.S. 647. (1935).
23. 896 U.S. 212. (1969).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1977

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [1977], Art. 5
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXlX

factually similar to Taylor and Minnie, the Court suggested that Congress
was the appropriate body to remedy the inequities caused by the navigable
waters test. Nacirema overturned an award under the Act to three longshoremen, two of whom were injured and the third killed when cargo being
hoisted by a ship's crane knocked them against the pier. The Court concluded:
There is much to be said for uniform treatment of longshoremen
injured while loading or unloading a ship. .

.

. [But] construing the

Longshoremen's Act to coincide with the limits of admiralty jurisdiction
- whatever they may be and however they may change - simply replaces
one line with another whose uncertain contours can only perpetuate
on the landward side of the Jensen line, the same confusion that previously existed on the seaward side. While we have no doubt that
Congress [could have so defined] the coverage of its compensation
remedy, the plain fact is that it chose instead the line in Jensen
separating water from land at the edge of the pier. The invitation to
move that
line landward must be addressed to Congress, not to this
24
Court.

The confusion referred to in Nacirema had been created by the second
provision of the 1927 Act which stated that federal compensation was not
available if recovery could validly be provided by state law. This provision
was universally interpreted5 as incorporating into the Act the judicially created
"maritime but local" rule.- The rule made state compensation acts applicable
to injuries resulting from certain judicially recognized activities that took
place over navigable waters but had no direct relationship to navigation and
maritime commerce. 26 Since claimants falling within the "maritime but local"
rule had a remedy under state compensation law, Congress excluded them
from coverage under the federal Act.
Despite this background, problems arose over the scope of the "may not
validly be provided" clause. For example, some early federal court decisions
interpreted this language as precluding coverage if the state could have
provided a remedy,2 7 while other decisions gave the provision a more restricted
24. Id. at 223-24.
25. See G. GILMORE & C.

THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 419 (2d ed. 1975); D.
(1970).
26. This exception to the Jensen national uniformity doctrine first appeared in a 1921
Supreme Court decision, Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921) (holding that
application of a state's wrongful death statute was so local in character that it would
"not work material prejudice" to general maritime law). Garcia was applied one year later
in a workmen's compensation action in Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469
(1922). The Rohde Court denied relief under general maritime law principles to a worker
who was injured while constructing a vessel and had elected to receive payments under
a state compensation act. The Court held that since the parties had contracted under
local rules and since construction of a vessel is not a maritime incident, the uniformity
of the general maritime law would not be materially affected by application of local rules.
ROBERTSON,

BLACK,

ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 208

Id.
27. United States Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 64 F.2d 521, 525 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 290
U.S. 639 (1933). "South Carolina, unlike most of the states, has not seen fit to pass a
workmen's compensation act. But this circumstance is not material in the pending case,
for our decision depends upon the existence, and not upon the exercise, of the power of
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meaning, limiting the exception to instances in which the state actually had
provided a remedy. 28 In Davis v. Department of Labor & Industries,;9 decided
in 1942, a worker had drowned while dismantling a bridge over a navigable
river. Although the Washington courts denied relief based on that state's
workmen's compensation statute, the United States Supreme Court granted
the desired relief. The Court recognized a "shadowy area" in which courts
had been unable to give definitive rulings on whether relief should be sought
in state or federal courts. This lack of direction caused problems for employees
who, if they chose the wrong forum, faced expensive delay and the possibility
that a subsequent, properly filed claim would be barred by a statute of limitations. To end this confusion and unfairness the Court established a "twilight zone" of concurrent jurisdiction encompassing those situations in which
the court had not been able to give definitive rulings. The "twilight zone"
doctrine was based upon the presumptive validity of both state and federal
30
statutes, leaving the choice of forum to the claimant.
Under the authority of Davis, the Court later extended state compensation
to employees injured while repairing completed vessels at rest upon navigable
waters. Previously such injuries had been definitely established as falling outside the "maritime but local" exception and within admiralty jurisdiction. In
Calbeck v. Travellers Insurance Co.,31 decided in 1962, the Court allowed
compensation under the federal Act to an employee injured while working
upon a vessel under construction, even though such work had long been
established as falling within state jurisdiction under the "maritime but local"
doctrine.3 2 Rather than further extend the "twilight zone" doctrine, the Court
interpreted the Act to cover all injuries occurring on navigable waters. This
surprising opinion3 3 in effect overruled the traditional view that the "may
the state to give its people the benefits of such legislation." For a discussion of this
BENzDICT ON ADMiRALTY, supra note 4, §9.
28. Continental Gas. Co. v. Lawson, 64 F.2d 802, 805 (5th Cir. 1933). "State compensation laws and this compensation law of Congress are mutually exclusive of each other.
The existence of the act of 1927 must be taken into consideration and given effect in
determining whether under section 3 (33 USCA §903) thereof the compensation laws
of the states are valid and applicable; for state laws cannot now validly apply to a subject
matter over which Congress has exercised its exclusive jurisdiction."
29. 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
30. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion stated: "Federal and state enactments
have so accommodated themselves to the complexity and confusion introduced by the
Jensen ruling that the resources of adjudication can no longer bring relief from the
difficulties which the judicial process itself brought into being. Therefore, until Congress
sees fit to attempt another comprehensive solution of the problem, this -Court can do
no more than bring some order out of the remaining judicial chaos as marginal situations
come before us." Id. at 259.
31. 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
32. See cases cited note 26 supra.
33. The majority was severely criticized by both the dissent and commentators for
its interpretation of the Act. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Harlan, said: "I cannot
join in this exercise in judicial legerdemain. I think the statute still means what it
says, and what it has always been thought to mean - namely, that there can be no
recovery under the Act in cases where the State may constitutionally confer a workmen's
compensation remedy. While the result reached today may be a desirable one, it is

interpretation problem, see IA

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1977

5

686

Florida Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [1977], Art. 5

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[V7ol. XXIX

validly be provided" provision incorporated the "maritime but local" doctrine
into the Act. The Calbeck opinion established the shoreline as the sole
boundary of the covered area and thereby set the stage for the Nacirema
Court's invitation to Congress to move the line landward.
THE

1972

AMENDMENTS

To obtain coverage under the 1972 Amendments to the Act an injured
employee must pass a two-pronged situs-status test. The situs provision
contained in the original section 903(a) required that the injury occur over
navigable waters of the United States or any dry dock. Congress expanded that
provision by redefining "navigable waters" to include "any adjoining pier,
wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining
area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or
building a vessel." 34 While the situs of covered injuries was thus enlarged, a
narrower new status test was created by redefining "employee" in section
902(3). Under the original act an employee was covered unless specifically
excluded. The Amendments affirmatively define "employee" as "any person
engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other
person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harborworker including
a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker. ' ' 35 Thus, the net effect of
the Amendments was to increase the area in which an injury would be
covered and decrease the classes of eligible persons.3 6 In addition, the Amendments did not include the troublesome phrase excluding those cases in
which recovery could be obtained under state law.
simply not what the law provides." 370 U.S. at 132. For a summary of Justice Stewart's
attack on the majority opinion along with an excellent rebuttal by the author, see

D. ROBERTSON, supra note 25, at 214-19, 304-14. See also 4 A. LARSON, supra note 20, §89.52.
34. Section 903(a) now reads: "Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in
respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results
from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any
adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining
area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a
vessel). No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of- (I) A

master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person engaged by the master to load
or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net; or (2) An officer or employee
of the United States or any agency thereof or of any State or foreign government, or of
any political subdivision thereof." 33 U.S.C. §903(a) (1970 & Supp. II 1972) (emphasis
indicating change added). The Amendments also changed the definition of "employer" to
correspond with this broadened situs test. 33 U.S.C. §902(4) (1970 & Supp. II 1972).
35. Section 902(3) now reads: "The term 'employee' means any person engaged in
maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring
operations, and any harborworker including a ship repairman,shipbuilder, and shipbreaker,

but such term does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person
engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons
net." 33 U.S.C. §902(3) (1970 & Supp. II 1972) (emphasis indicating change added).
36. See Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1976),
af'd sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 45 U.S.L.W. 4729 (1977); Weyerhauser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 179 (1976); I.T.O. Corp.
of Baltimore v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d 1080, 1083 (1975), modified on rehearing en
banc, 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1976).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol29/iss4/5

6

Whalen: Docking of the Longshoremens' and Harbor Workers' Compensation Ac
LHWCA

Although the 1972 Amendments might appear to be a direct response to
the Nacirema invitation to extend coverage shoreward,3 7 legislative history
suggests other more compelling reasons for the change. Congress was
particularly concerned with two other modifications of the Act: increasing the
inadequate benefits for injured workers- and removing from longshoremen
the seaman's remedy of unseaworthiness.3 9 While these latter two provisions
were vigorously debated in the committee hearings,40 the landward extension
of coverage did not appear in the early drafts but was added to the proposed
Amendments in "the frantic 4 a.m. final conference mark-up sessions." 4' 1 The

37. I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d 1080, 1086 (1975),
modified on rehearing en banc, 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1976).

38. Prior to the 1972 Amendments, the maximum benefit under the Act was $70 a
week while the average weekly wage for amphibious workers was over $200 in some
ports. The Amendments to the Act raised the maximum to $167 a week with a provision
increasing benefits to $318.38 in 1975. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 3,
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4698, 4700-01. The Senate Report, S. REP.
No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972), and the House Report, H.R. REP. No. 92-1441,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4698, are
almost identical.
39. "The Committee also rejected the thesis that a vessel should be liable without
regard to its fault for injuries sustained by employees covered under this Act while
working on board the vessel. Vessels have been held to what amounts to such absolute
liability by decisions of the Supreme Court, commencing with Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
328 U.S. 85 (1946) which held that the traditional seamen's remedy based on the breach
of the vessel's absolute, nondelegable duty to provide a seaworthy vessel was also available
to longshoremen and others who performed work on the vessel which by tradition has
been performed by seamen. Under the Sieracki case, vessels are liable, as third parties, for
injuries suffered by longshoremen as a result of 'unseaworthy' conditions even though the
unseaworthiness was caused, created, or brought into play by the stevedore (or an employee
of the stevedore) rather than the vessel or any member of its crew. . . .Furthermore, . ..
under the Supreme Court's decision in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.,

350 U.S. 124 (1956), the vessel may recover the damages for which it is liable to the
injured longshoreman from the stevedore which employed the longshoreman on the
theory that the stevedore has breached an express or implied warranty of workmanlike
performance to the vessel. The end result is that, despite the provision in the Act
which limits an employer's liability to the compensation and medical benefits provided in
the Act, a stevedore-employer is indirectly liable for damages to an injured longshoreman
who utilizes the techniques of suing the vessel under the unseaworthiness doctrine." H.R.
REP. No. 92-1441, supra note 38, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4702. See
also Cohen & Doughterty, 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act: An Opportunity for Equitable Uniformity in Tripartite Industrial
Accident Litigation, 19 N.Y.L.F. 587 (1974); Stockers, An Analysis of the Formulation of
Policy: The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of

1972, Program Material for Admiralty Law Seminar (June 15, 1973); Thies, Amended
Section Five of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 41 TENN. L.
REv. 773 (1974); Note, Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972: An End to Circular Liability and Seaworthiness in Return for Modern
Benefits, 27 U. MIAMi L. REv. 94 (1972).
40. See, e.g., Hearings on S.2318, S.525, S. 1547 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 174-77, 820-21 (1972).
41. 4 A. LamoN, supra note 20, §89A8.
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extension was apparently a concession to maritime workers in exchange for
42
surrender of the right to unlimited awards through unseaworthiness actions.
This history might explain, but does not excuse, the unfortunate lack of
care in drafting those sections of the Amendments extending coverage onto
shore. Courts interpreting the amended coverage sections have had only the
rather dim light shed by committee reports accompanying the final drafts
of the Amendments to assist them. As one might expect under these conditions, the courts' interpretation have shown little consistency.
For several years, the sole interpreter of the Amendments was the Benefits
Review Board 3 which replaced the federal district courts as the reviewer
of decisions made by administrative law judges. 44 Thus, a considerable body
of law, invariably favoring injured maritime workers, 45 had developed before
the circuit courts first confronted the changes. 4c By October, 1975, Judge
Craven of the Fourth Circuit was able to identify six consistent Board interpretations involving the shoreward extension of the Act:
1. Outright rejection of the "point of rest" theoryt 471 as a determinative
factor in cases where coverage is disputed.
2. Waterborne cargo remains in maritime commerce until such time
as it is delivered to a trucker or other carrier to be taken from
the terminal for further transshipment.
3. Cargo first enters maritime commerce when it is unloaded from a
truck or other carrier and is handled by terminal employees working
upon the "navigable waters" of the United States as defined in the
Act.
4. The "loading and unloading" of ships is a continuous process
involving many different employees working at various places within
the terminal area and performing different tasks, but includes the
handling of cargo during all times it is in maritime commerce.
5. It is sufficient to bring an employee within the scope of maritime
employment that his duties at the time of injury involve handling
cargo that is in maritime commerce.
6. The Act does not require that one actually be engaged in loading or
unloading
vessels to be an "employee" within the meaning of the
48
Act.

42. Professors Gilmore arid Black call the concessions a "political resolution" and a
"tradeoff." G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 25, at 411.
43. See 33 U.S.C. §921(b) (1970 & Supp. II 1972).
44. 33 U.S.C. §919 (1970 & Supp. II 1972). This section explains the procedure for
presenting a claim. See also Fallon, Practice and Procedure for Handling Claims Under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act as Amended, 23 LA. B.J. 121

(1975).
45. See generally 4 A. LARsON, supra note 20, §§89.27-.49. Professor Larson's treatise
contains a detailed interpretation of the 1972 Amendments based on an extensive analysis
of opinions by administrative law judge and the Benefits Review Board.
46. Because the Act applied only to injuries arising after the date of enactment,
October 27, 1972, it was not until late 1975 that circuit court opinions construing the new
coverage provisions began to appear. Conversely, as late as March 29, 1977, a case was
decided under the preamendment coverage provision. See St. Louis Shipbuilding Co. v.
Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 551 F.2d 1119 (8th Cir. 1977).
47. For a discussion of the point of rest doctrine, see text accompanying notes 93-96

infra.
48. I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d 1080, 1092-93 (1975)
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Although Judge Craven argued that these interpretations are "entitled to
great deference by the courts," 49 no circuit has demonstrated an intent to
defer to the Board's decisions; indeed, the two circuits that have directly
addressed the issue expressly rejected the suggestion.50
While the courts have not deferred to the Board's interpretations of the
Act, they have indicated a willingness to give the Board a freer hand in the
application of the Act to specific cases5 l and to limit their review of the
Board's factual findings to the substantial evidence rule. 52 Since the Board
now performs essentially the same function as did the district courts prior
to the Amendments, ss a limited review of the Board's decisions seems proper. 54
(Craven, J., dissenting), modified on rehearing en banc, 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1976).
49. Arguing in favor of judicial deference to Board rulings, Judge Craven contended:
"A consistent and contemporaneous construction of a statute by the agency charged with
its enforcement is entitled to great deference by the courts." 529 F.2d at 1091. Under the
Act's new provisions the Secretary of Labor is given authority to administer the Act
and to make necessary rules and regulations. Furthermore, the Board, whose members are
appointed by the Secretary, is directed to hear substantial issues of law and fact. Concluding that the Board had interpreted the coverage provision in a consistent manner,
Judge Craven suggested that these decisions should be accorded great weight. 529 F.2d
at 1093-94.
50. The First Circuit in Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F.2d
264 (1st Cir. 1976), and the Second Circuit in Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura,
544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 45
U.S.L.W. 4729 (1977), examined the deference question in light of three criteria suggested
by Professor Davis in his treatise on administrative law, 4 K. DAvis, ADmINISTRATIVE LAw
TREATISE §§30.01-.09 (1958 & Supp. 1970): (1) the relative expertise of agency and court;
(2) whether there is express statutory delegation of the question to the agency; and (3)

whether the problem involves general propositions or the application of general propositions
to specific facts. These courts agreed that all three criteria as applied to Board interpretations militated against deference. Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, 539 F.2d at
269-70; Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d at 49-50.
51. The Fifth Circuit said broadly that it "will not set aside an award made by the
Benefits Review Board so long as it is supported by substantial evidence on the record
considered as a whole, and so long as there is a reasonable legal basis for the Board's
conclusion." Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533, 541 (5th Cir. 1976).
While it may appear that the court adopted an approach of general deference to Board
rulings, including statutory interpretation, such a reading is of dubious merit. First, the
general statement of deference is qualified by the last phrase, "so long as there is a
reasonable legal basis for the Board's conclusion." This legal basis will most probably come
from the circuit court's interpretation of the statute. It is also significant that this statement appears in the section entitled "The Coverage Issue in These Appeals" and no mention
of deference is made in the preceding section of the opinion construing the coverage
provision of the amendments. Id. at 541 (emphasis added). Similarly, the First Circuit
,concluded: "[W]hile on occasion we may well expect to defer to the Secretary or the
Board in particular applications, we see neither the Board nor the Secretary as having
been commissioned to settle the sort of question, involving the general construction of an
act of Congress, encountered here." Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539
F.2d 264, 269-70 (1st Cir. 1976) (emphasis added).
52. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'd
sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 45 U.S.L.W. 4729 (1977); Stockman
v. John T. Clark ScSon of Boston, Inc., 539 F.2d 264, 270 (1st Cir. 1976).
53. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
54. I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d at 1091-92.
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Thus, while all circuit courts will probably view the decisions of the
Benefits Review Board with "interest and respect," 5' 5 the job of redefining
the inland boundary of the Act's coverage rests with the several circuit
courts of appeal and, ultimately, with the Supreme Court. Most of the
admiralty circuits have now addressed the problem of interpreting the dual
situs-status requirements.
THE EXPANDED SITUs TEST

As previously discussed, the amendment to section 903(a) expanded the
definition of "navigable -waters" to include "any adjoining pier, wharf, dry
dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area
customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building
a vessel." 56 The requirement that an employee's injury occur within such a
situs thus far has presented few problems for claimants. The change, however,
has already started to create problems of interpretation in the courts.
The most expansive interpretation of the situs test was offered by the
Third Circuit in Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs (Johns),57 in which the situs requirement was effectively read out of the Act.5 8 The claimant in Johns was injured when the
truck he was driving overturned on a public street one-half mile from the
nearest water but within a large marine terminal. The administrative law
judge denied recovery, finding that while the claimant had been engaged in
maritime employment, thus meeting the status test, he was not injured at a
situs within the amended coverage section. The Board reversed, ruling that
the claimant was injured at a covered situs. On appeal, the Third Circuit
began its interpretation with the unique view that a dual situs-status test
existed prior to the 1972 Amendments.59 Relying heavily on legislative history,
the court noted that the dominant purpose of the landward extension was
55. Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F.2d 264, 269 (Ist Cir. 1976).
56. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
57. 540 F.2d 629 (3rd Cir. 1976). See generally 50 TEMp. L. Q. 177 (1976).
58. However, the Johns court remanded the case to the administrative law judge to
determine whether the facts supported a finding that the employee met the status test.
The employee in this case was injured "on a public street in the marine terminal," id.
at 639 (emphasis added), and would therefore have clearly met the situs requirement
under the more restrictive interpretation of the coverage section. While this point might
be urged by persons wanting to revive the situs requirement in the Third Circuit, the
court left little doubt that the place of injury was not dispositive.
59. Id. at 636. The Supreme Court and other circuits have stated that prior to the
Amendments the situs requirement was the only test that an employee had to pass.
These courts recognize the status test as a creation of the amended "employee" definition
in 33 U.S.C. §902(3) (1970 & Supp. II 1972). See Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo,
45 U.S.L.W. 4729, 4733 (1977) ("The amendments thus changed what had been essentially
only a 'situs' test of eligibility for compensation to one looking to both the 'situs' of the
injury and the 'status' of the injured."); Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544
F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1976), afj'd sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 45
U.S.L.W. 4729 (1977); Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533, 537-38 (5th Cir.
1976); Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F.2d 264, 271 (1st Cir. 1976);
I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d at 1083. See generally Weyerhauser
Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976).
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to create uniformity of coverage for maritime workers. The court then concluded that in order to create uniformity, any geographic limitations upon
federal coverage must be eliminated. As a result, the sole test in the Third
Circuit is whether the employee's activities have a "functional relationship"
with maritime transportation.6 0
In an attempt to reconcile this interpretation with some apparently conflicting language in the Act,61 the Johns court reasoned that references to
"navigable waters" in the amended "employer" definition and "coverage"
section were not restrictive situs requirements, but were only a shorthand
method of establishing a jurisdictional nexus between the claimant and
waterborne transportation.6 2 Thus, it is the locus of the vessel and not the
situs of the injury that creates admiralty jurisdiction. 3
This construction of the amended sections distorts the congressional uniformity objective and disregards language in the Act that clearly suggests
that the congressional purpose was not so venturesome. The "employee" and
"employer" definitional sections are sufficient to insure that a jurisdictional
nexus is maintained with maritime activities. Thus, if the Third Circuit's
understanding of the congressional intent is correct, there was little need for
the retention, and less need for the revision of the coverage provision.
The specific language of the amended coverage section is even more
difficult to reconcile with the Third Circuit's interpretation. Section 903(a)
retained the provision that compensation is payable "only if the disability
or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the
United States."6 4 This language clearly requires that the situs test be met by
the injured employee,65 not by only the vessel, for purposes of establishing a
jurisdictional nexus. Significantly, Congress limited the extension of coverage
to "any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock . . . , or other adjoining area
customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing or building a vessel."6' 6 If the list of covered areas is merely illustrative, as the Third
Circuit contended in Johns, there was no reason for Congress to employ "adjoining," a word that could only serve to limit coverage. The decision in
Johns failed to address these objections.
Other circuits, taking a more literal approach to the wording of section
903(a), agree that a situs test does exist and must be met by the claimant
60. See text accompanying note 116 infra.

61. The court recognized that its interpretation was not within the clear meaning
of the Act: "Congress was cautious in its language, but the fact remains that it intended
to expand the scope of the LHWCA to provide a federal workmen's compensation remedy
for all maritime employees .... We concede, as we must, that the draftsmanship of the
1972 Amendments leaves something to be desired and, to a certain extent, obscures this
purpose from view." 540 F.2d at 638.
62. Id.
63. The Third Circuit has thus retained a situs requirement only as it relates to the

vessel. "It is the situs of the vessels in maritime commerce, not the situs of their maritime
employees at the time of the injury, that in [that court's] view Congress referred to by
its reference to navigable waters." Id.
64. 33 U.S.C. §903(a) (1970 & Supp. II 1972) (emphasis added).
65.

See A. LARsON, supra note 20, §89.30.

66. 33 U.S.C. §903(a) (1970 & Supp. H. 1972) (emphasis added).
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to recover under the Act. All circuits agree that "adjoining" means "adjoining navigable waters."6 7 In Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston,
Inc.68 the First Circuit rejected the argument that Congress had intended
to limit "adjoining" to those areas contiguous to the specific vessel being
unloaded. The claimant in Stockman was injured while removing cargo
from a container at a marine terminal located on the water but across the
harbor from the berth of the vessel that had discharged the container. Upon
discharge the container had been hauled by an independent trucking firm
overland two miles to the situs of the injury. The court recognized that
Congress intended only to cover terminals "associated with the shipboard
movement of marine cargoes." 69 Still the Stockman court found that the
terminal was a covered situs since it adjoined navigable waters and was
customarily used in loading and unloading vessels. 0
The most troublesome problems of interpretation have arisen over the
requirement that an area be "customarily used by an employee in loading,
unloading, repairing or building a vessel." Apparent confusion has developed
whether to apply the "customarily used" requirement to all of the specified
areas of coverage or only the catch-all "other adjoining area." One decision,
while not turning upon the interpretation of "customarily used," failed to
distinguish between the specified areas and the catch-all phrase in applying
the coverage section. The Fifth Circuit in Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v.
Perdue7l denied recovery to an employee injured while going to "punch out"
at a management office located within the terminal but approximately one
mile from the vessel on which the employee was working. 72 The court found
that neither the office nor the facilities separating the office from the docks
were customarily used for loading, unloading, or any other specified use, or
adjoined navigable waters; therefore, these areas did not meet the situs
test.7 3

The Perdue decision raised the additional question of how much of an
area must be customarily used for the specified activities. Is the use of a part
of a large terminal for one of the specified uses sufficient when the particular
part of the terminal at which the injury occurs is not so used? The Fifth
Circuit in Perdue held that it was not.74 In denying recovery to the employee,

the court "reject[ed] the argument that the new Act covers every point in a
large marine facility where a ship repairman might go at his employer's
direction,"7 5 requiring that "a putative situs actually be used for loading,
unloading, or one of the other functions specified in the Act. '7 6
67. See also Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F.2d 264, 272 (Ist
Cir. 1976) (" 'Adjoining' can only refer to navigable waters.").
68. 539 F.2d 264 (Ist Cir. 1976).
69. Id. at 272.

70. Id.
71. 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976).
72.
73.

Id. at 541.
Id. at 542.

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 541.
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The Fourth Circuit in LT.O. Corp. of Baltimore v. Benefits Review
Board77 allowed recovery when only part of the terminal in which the
claimant was injured was customarily used for one of the specified purposes.
Even though the court had earlier found that the exact situs of the claimant's
injury was not used for a specified purpose78 it concluded, "We have no
doubt that each of the claimants satisfied the situs test of the post-1972 Act.
At a minimum, they were injured at a terminal, adjoining navigable waters
and used in the overall process of loading and unloading a vessel." 79 Thus,
the situs while not adjoining navigable waters nor being used for any of
the specified purposes was still a covered situs because it was located within
a terminal customarily used for loading and unloading vessels.
Judge Friendly, speaking for the Second Circuit in Pittston Stevedoring
o
addressed both questions: whether "customarily used"
Corp. v. Dellavantura,8
applies to the catch-all phrase "other adjoining area" as well as the specified
areas of coverage; and whether usage of a part but not the part of a specified
area suffices. The Pittston court reviewed, along with other cases, the award
to Blundo, a worker injured while checking cargo being removed from a
container at a pier not being used for actual shipboard loading or unloading
but rather as a storage area. In holding that the claimant satisfied the situs
requirement, Judge Friendly noted that any pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal,
building way, or marine railroad meets the situs requirement if it adjoins
navigable water. Thus, the Second Circuit interpreted the "customarily used"
requirement to refer only to the catch-all category "other adjoining area." 8'
Moreover, the Pittston court concluded that a claimant satisfied the situs
requirement when his injury occurred on a pier located within a terminal
82
"a part of which was used for loading and unloading vessels."
The Supreme Court on certiorari upheld the awards made by the Second
Circuit in Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo.83 In Northeast Marine
77. Although the I.T.O. decision was modified upon rehearing en banc, the Fourth
Circuit did not alter the original situs findings. See I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore v. Benefits
Review Bd., 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1976).
78. The Court had rescribed the area in which the claimant was injured: "Shed 11
was 685 feet from the water's edge. It was not connected geographically or functionally
with the ships' berthing area, and ships were neither loaded nor unloaded from it."
529 F.2d at 1082.
79. Id. at 1083-84.
80. 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v.
Caputo, 45 U.S.L.W. 4729 (1977).
81. The court first edited the Act's coverage section to read: "including any adjoining
pier . . . or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading,

repairing or building a vessel." 1'd. at 51 n.19 (emphasis in original). Relying upon this
version the Second Circuit concluded, "It would seem that any pier next to the water is
included within the situs definition." Id.
82. Neither LT.O. nor Pittston satisfactorily answers the question raised above: How
much of a terminal needs to be customarily used for a designated purpose to satisfy the
situs test? This problem could be a persistent one considering the existence of sprawling
marine terminals throughout the country, many of which are large enough to contain
their own public roads. See, e.g., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, 540 F.2d at 634.
83. 45 U.S.L.W. 4729 (1977).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1977

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [1977], Art. 5
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

the Court reviewed the consolidated cases of Blundo, the worker injured while
checking a container resting on a pier, and Caputo, a worker injured while
loading cargo recently unloaded from ships onto a consignee's truck.
In Caputo's case, however, the situs requirement was not contested because
the truck being loaded was parked within a terminal adjoining navigable
84
water, parts of which were used for loading and unloading vessels.
The stevedoring company again argued that because the "customarily
used" requirement was not met, claimant Blundo failed the situs test. The
Court noted that while one sponsor of the bill had shown little concern
with how piers, wharves, and terminals were used, "it is not at all clear that
the adjectival phrase 'customarily used . . .'was intended to modify more

than the immediately preceding noun phrase 'other areas' [sic]." 85 Nonetheless,
the Court continued, even if "customarily used" also modifies the specified
areas, "Blundo satisfied the situs test in the same way that Caputo did -by
working in an 'adjoining terminal . . .customarily used . . .in loading [and]

unloading.' The entire terminal facility adjoined the water and one of its
two finger-piers clearly was used for loading and unloading vessels. "'88
Thus, while not resolving the issue of which terms are modified by
"customarily used," the Supreme Court has mooted the problem in most
situations by adopting a broad definition of "terminal" and allowing coverage
if part of the terminal is used for loading, unloading, or some other expressly
included function. Such an approach is consistent with the common meaning
of "terminal," which includes the entire marine facility regardless of the relationship of the specific place of injury to the loading and unloading
processes8 7 For example, an employee, like the worker in Perdue, injured
in front of the stevedore's management office would satisfy the Supreme Court's
situs test provided part of the marine terminal within which the office was
located was customarily used for one of the specified uses. The Court left
undefined how great a part of the terminal must be so used and how remote
that portion may be from the place of injury and still satisfy the test.
This problem could be resolved by adoption of the Second Circuit's approach
applying "customarily used" only to the catch-all phrase "other adjoining
areas."88 In this manner all areas within a terminal would be included as
long as the terminal adjoined navigable waters.
THE STATuS TEST

The goal of creating a uniform compensation system for maritime workers
was fulfilled by moving the Act's coverage onto shore. In expanding the situs
84. Id. at 4737.
85. Id.
86.

Id.

87. Webster's dictionary defines "terminal" as it relates to carriage of goods as "a: either
end of a carrier line (as a railroad, trucking or shipping line, or airline) with classifying
yards, dock and lighterage facilities, management offices, storage sheds, and freight and
passenger stations, b: a freight or passenger station that is central to a considerable area or

serves as a junction at any point with other lines, c: a town or city at the end of a
carrier line." WEeSTER's TIRD Naw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2359 (1961).
88. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
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of covered injuries, however, Congress did not want to provide benefits for
employees who while on the waterfront, were not engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel.5 9 The drafters therefore included a
status test in the 1972 Amendments redefining "employee" to include only
persons "engaged in maritime employment." 90 Unfortunately, Congress failed
to define the latter phrase.
While section 902(3) specifically included longshoremen and other persons
engaged in longshoring operations, and harbor workers, including ship repairmen, shipbuilders, and shipbreakers, 91 the courts agree that the meanings
of these terms are so unsettled, that resort to the legislative history is
necessary. 92 However, even reliance on legislative history has failed to produce
judicial agreement over when a worker should be considered as engaged in
maritime employment.
One of the earliest and most persistent problems involving the status test
was the extent to which the Act's benefits were available to persons engaged
in the overall process of loading and unloading a vessel. The Fourth Circuit
in I.T.O.93 was the first court to interpret "maritime employment" in this
context.94 I.T.O. involved claims by three persons injured while engaged in
the process of loading and unloading a vessel. Their claims were first decided
by a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit. At that time Judge Winter,
speaking for the majority, explained "that the Act's benefits extend only to
those persons, including checkers, who unload cargo from the ship to the
first point of rest at the terminal or load cargo from the last point of rest
89. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, supra note 38, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEws 4708.
90. See note 35 supra.
91. Id.
92. Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F.2d at 272; I.T.O. Corp. of
Baltimore v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d at 1084-85 ("Because we conclude that the
terms . . . are not such words of art that we would be justified in deciding the case
without resort to the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments and full consideration
of the context in which they were enacted, we turn to these secondary sources."). Contra,
I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d at 1094 (Craven, J., dissenting).
Judge Craven would not have resorted to the legislative history, but would have relied
instead upon a line of cases that he felt clearly placed the claimants within the established
meaning of "maritime employment." Judge Craven suggested that even if the statutory
language were ambiguous, the courts should rely upon: (1) an established rule of broad
statutory construction, (2) a statutory presumption of coverage, (3) adherence to administrative agencies' liberal construction of the coverage section, and (4) a narrow scope
of review of the Board's determinations. Id.
93. 529 F.2d at 1080.
94. Actually the first interpretation was made by the Ninth Circuit in Weyerhauser
Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976), but the
facts in that case were so unique that it has not been cited extensively by the other
circuits. See Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston. Inc., 539 F.2d at 268 n.3. In
Gilmore the Ninth Circuit overturned an award to a pondman injured when he fell into
a log pond while sorting logs for processing at a lumber mill. The court emphasized
that for an employee to be covered his own work "must have a realistically significant
relationship to 'traditional maritime activity involving navigation and commerce on navigable
waters.'" 528 F.2d at 961.
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at the terminal to the ship."9 This holding became known as the point of
rest doctrine. Applying the doctrine to the cases at bar, the court determined
that because all three injuries occurred at some stage of loading or unloading
landward of the point of rest, none passed the status test.96
Judge Craven, in dissent, 97 found that the point of rest approach erected
an artificial, second situs test not intended by Congress. 98 Judge Craven concluded that all three claimants were covered because they were all injured
in the process of loading or unloading a ship located within a covered situs. 99
In 1976, "[b]ecause of the importance and novelty of the questions decided"
six judges of the Fourth Circuit court reheard I.T.O. en banc. 100 On rehearing
the original panel's majority and dissent each gained one vote. The third
additional judge, Judge 'Widener, subscribed to a modified point of rest
doctrine redefining the test to be "whether an otherwise eligible employee is
injured while engaged in loading or unloading a ship" as opposed to loading
or unloading the land-based delivery vehicle. 10 1 Judge Widener thus concurred in the reversal of the award given to the claimant who was injured
10 2
while moving cargo from a storage shed onto a waiting delivery truck,
finding this claimant was no longer engaged in unloading the vessel but
was instead loading the truck. 03 Judge Widener, however, also concurred
95. 529 F.2d at 1081.
96. The specific facts of the three cases were as follows: Claimant Adkins, a forklift
operator, was injured while loading cargo, which had been previously removed from its
container, onto an awaiting delivery truck. Claimant Brown, also a forklift operator,
suffered carbon monoxide poisioning while transporting cargo from a warehouse where
it had been stored to the side of a container. Later, the cargo would be loaded into
the container and transported to a marshalling area on a pier for loading aboard ship.
Claimant Harris was injured while transporting containers from the storage area to the
marshalling area adjacent the ship. Id. at 1082. In these cases the majority determined
that the point of rest for both loading and unloading purposes was the marshalling area
at the side of the ship. Id. at 1087.
97. Id. at 1089 (Craven, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 1096. Accord, Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F.2d
at 275. Judge Craven also expressed concern over the fact that the point of rest approach
would give stevedoring companies the "power to shift unilaterally (the area of coverage]
seaward or shoreward at [their] whim or caprice." 529 F.2d at 1096.
99. Judge Craven recognized that all three claimants had "subject[ed] themselves to
the risks inherent in moving and handling cargo and in operating the potentially dangerous
machinery of the trade." 529 F.2d at 1101. In support of a risk distribution approach, see
Note, On the Waterfront: The Fourth Circuit Draws the Line at the Point of Rest in a
Narrow Interpretationof the LIIWCA Amendments of 1972, 54 N.C. L. REv. 925, 937 (1976).
100. I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore v. Benefits Review Bd., 542 F.2d 903, 905 (4th Cir. 1976).
101. Id.
102. Thus, Judge Widener's modified point of rest in this case is located at the storage
area as opposed to the marshalling area as designated by the I.T.O. majority. In a
dissenting opinion, Judge Butzner acknowledged that this compromise alleviated some of
the harsh results of the I.T.O. majority's decision, but added: "It does so, however, at
the expense of adding the factor of lapse of time to the vague concept of place for
determining the point of rest. Rational, uniform application of the court's theory to
the myriad circumstances in which injuries occur will be most difficult." Id. at 910 (Butzner,
J., dissenting). The compromise point of rest approach is a good example of the often
necessary trade-off between uniform coverage and ease of application.
103.

Id. at 905.
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with the dissenters in LT.O. who urged affirmance of the awards to the
claimant injured while "stuffing" a container to be later loaded aboard a
ship and to the claimant injured while transporting a full container to the
marshalling area.10 4
Thus, the Fourth Circuit has suggested three possible approaches to the
determination of status: (1) the LT.O. majority's point of rest doctrine,
(2) the I.T.O. dissent's maritime commerce approach, and (3) Judge Widener's
compromise excluding workers engaged in loading and unloading land
delivery vehicles. These three different approaches left claimants and stevedoring companies within the Fourth Circuit facing a "twilight zone" equal
in breadth to its preamendment predecessor.
The Fourth Circuit's modification of the point of rest doctrine foreshadowed the unfavorable reception the doctrine has had by commentators' 0 5
and other courts, 0 6 culminating in an outright rejection by the Supreme
Court. 0 7 In Northeast Marine the Court echoed the attacks of the circuit
courts exposing the weaknesses of the point of rest approach. As first noted
by Judge Craven in his I.T.O. dissent'08 and later by the Fifth Circuit in
Perdue,0 9 the point of rest approach was never mentioned in the Act, the
committee reports, or elsewhere in the legislative history." 0 The Supreme
Court called the omission of a term of such alleged widespread use "both
conspicuous and telling.""' Since the Act is remedial in nature, the courts
have refused to infer such a restrictive meaning. Instead, the courts opposing
the point of rest approach have readily followed the earlier instructions of
the Supreme Court that the Act be liberally construed in conformance with
1 2
its purpose.
Secondly, the language of the committee reports reveals a specific intent
to cover workers landward of the point of rest. After noting that the Act
expressly covered "any longshoreman" in addition to "other persons engaged
in longshoring operations," the Pittston court concluded that a longshoreman
must sometimes be covered even when not engaged in work traditionally
104. Id.
105. See Note, supra note 99; Comment, Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Recovery Denied Longshoremen Injured Landward of the "Point of Rest,"
10 SUFFOLK U.L. Rxv. 1079 (1976).

106. Dravo Corp. v. Maxim, 545 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1976); Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v.
Dellaventura, 544 F.2d at 35; Sea-Land Serv. Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (Johns), 540 F.2d at 629; Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d

at 533;
107.
108.
109.
110.

Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F.2d at 264.
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 45 U.S.L.W. at 4737.
529 F.2d at 1096 (Craven, J., dissenting).
539 F.2d at 540.

But see Vickery, Some Impacts of the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 41 INs. COUNSEL J. 63, 68 (1974) (arguing that
the point of rest was the shoreside boundary intended by the committee).
111. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 45 U.S.L.W. at 4736.
112. In Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953), the Supreme Court directed: "This
Act must be liberally construed in conformance with its purpose, and in a way which
avoids harsh and incongruous results." See Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539
F.2d at 540 n.21; Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F.2d at 275 n.9;
Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d at 51.
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associated with this occupation. Noting that persons handling cargo seaward
of the point of rest were involved in longshoring operations, the Pittston
court further reasoned that if the point of rest theory had been correct,
there would have been no need to add the category "longshoreman. '1' 1 3 Relying
on the same language but emphasizing the Act's focus on the employee's
occupation rather than his particular task at the moment of injury, the
Supreme Court rejected the point of rest doctrine as failing to comply with
the uniformity objective.""
While the courts that reject the point of rest doctrine are not in total
agreement where maritime employment ends, the consensus is that coverage
extends to workers whose injuries pass the situs test and who are directly
involved in handling cargo until it crosses the transshipment point, entering
the possession of the consignee or land carrier. 115 This rule, however, is
subject to various limitations discussed below.
Since the Third Circuit in Johns had eliminated the situs test from coverage
determinations, their sole inquiry concerned the claimant's status. In deciding
whether a claimant injured while transporting cargo between an old and
new terminal was a covered employee, the Third Circuit concluded: "The
key is the functional relationship of the employee's activity to maritime
transportation, as distinguished from such land-based activities as trucking,
railroading or warehousing."'1 6 Absent sufficient facts, however, the court
remanded the case for a determination whether the claimant had met the
functional relationship test.
The Fifth Circuit in Perdue1 7 specifically held that "an injured worker
is a covered 'employee' if at the time of his injury (a) he was performing
the work of loading, unloading, repairing, building, or breaking a vessel, or
(b) although he was not actually carrying out these specified functions, he was
'directly involved' in such work.""" Applying this test to a claimant injured
while securing a military vehicle to a railway flatcar for carriage inland, the
court reasoned that because the work being performed was "evidently an
integral part of the process of moving maritime cargo from a ship to land
transportation," 9 the claimant was "engaged in maritime employment"
20
even though the vehicle had clearly passed the point of rest.'
113.

544 F.2d at 52.

114. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4736.
115. The transshipment point is not a spacial boundary, like the point of rest, but
is the place or time at which cargo leaves or arrives in maritime commerce. In practice, it
has usually been found to be reached when cargo has been placed on or removed from, in
instances of loading vessels, the vehicle of the consignee.
116. 540 F.2d at 639. Coverage therefore depended upon establishing "a nexus between
the employer-employee relationship and maritime commerce." Id. at 637.
117. 539 F.2d at 533.
118. Id. at 539-40.
119. Id. at 543.
120. The court was asked by the defendant to deny recovery on the basis of the lapse
of time (two to seventeen days) between the unloading of the cargo from the vessel and
the reloading on the land carrier's railroad flatcar, the time of injury. The court was also
asked to consider that the claimant's union was the "warehousemen's" rather than the
"longshoremen's" union. Both of these arguments were rejected. Id. at 543 n.24.
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Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit required that the status test be met "at
the time of the injury," 121 thereby excluding from coverage a ship repairman injured while at work, but who at the precise moment of injury was
not engaged in maritime employment. 12 2 While this time of injury approach
may appear to be supported by the language of the employee section - "engaged in" - as opposed to the broader language of the employer section
- "employed in" 123 it is at odds with the Amendments' purpose of promoting
uniform coverage.
Pittston extended coverage to all cargo handlers meeting the situs test
who "are engaged in the handling of cargo up to the point where the consignor has actually begun its movement from the pier (or in the case of
loading, from the time when the consignor has stopped his vehicle at the
pier)."124 The intent expressed in the committee report to extend coverage
only to those employees "who would otherwise be covered by [the] Act for
part of their activity,"'125 led the court to add the proviso that the employee
must have "spent a significant part of his time in the typical longshoring
activity of taking cargo on or off a vessel. '1 26 While the proviso in this
instance was mere dictum,- if followed in future cases it would only perpetuate the arbitrary distinctions the amended coverage section was intended
to eliminate. The First Circuit12 has avoided this problem by interpreting
"part of their activity" to refer to classes of maritime employees rather than
to individuals.1 29 Thus, that circuit requires only that the claimant establish
membership in a class of employees, e.g., longshoremen, whose members
would have been covered for part of their activity prior to the Amendments. 3 0
Citing the congressional desire to promote uniformity in the coverage of
amphibious workers, the Supreme Court in NortheastMarine upheld coverage
121. Id. at 539. Accord, Weyerhauser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1975).

The Fifth Circuit equates the requirements that the employee be engaged in one of the
specified activities at the time of the injury with the rules that general job classification
and union affiliation are not to be considered. See 539 F.2d at 539.
122. 539 F.2d at 542.
123. See Comment, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act:
Coverage After the 1972 Amendments, 55 TEx. L. Rnv. 99, 122-23 (1976).
124. 544 F.2d at 56.
125. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, supra note 38, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG & AD.
NEws 4711.
126. 544 F.2d at 56.
127. Because the worker to whom this proviso was directed did spend a significant
part of his workday on the vessel, the court did not feel it necessary to examine fully this
problem. Instead, the court concluded: "[W]hether this proviso is essential can be left for
another day." Id. The Second Circuit is apparently interpreting the passage to require
that some of the claimant's work be performed aboard a vessel where he would have
qualified for coverage prior to the Amendments.
128. Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F.2d at 264.
129. The Stockman court interpreted the provision as a demonstration of congressional
intent not to include "whole new groups" and "classes of employees" such as clerical
workers. The court concluded that a putative covered class must either fall into a recognized

category of maritime employment or be one shown to perform some shipboard duties.
Id. at 277.
130. Id.
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for the claimant, Caputo, who was injured while loading cargo onto an
awaiting delivery truck.13 ' The Court placed little emphasis on the nature
of the task being performed by Caputo at the moment of injury, finding an
"obvious desire to cover longshoremen whether or not their particular task
at the moment of injury is clearly a 'longshoring operation.' "132 Therefore,
the "time of injury" approach taken by the Fifth Circuit in Perdue apparently
is overruled. The Court relied instead upon the Act's focus on "occupations ' 133
longshoreman, harbor worker, ship repairman, shipbuilder, shipbreaker."
Thus the Supreme Court's test emphasizes the question whether the injured
employee is a longshoreman rather than whether he is at the moment of
injury engaged in longshoring operations. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
found a congressional intent that "longshoremen" means persons who spend
"at least some of their time in indisputably longshoring operations and who,
'
without the amendments, would be covered for only part of their activity."' 3
Thus, the First Circuit's attempt to eliminate the troublesome "part of their
activity" phrase by applying it to classes instead of particular employees was
not followed by the Supreme Court. Rather, the phrase remains as an obstacle
in the path to recovery for those workers whose employment never requires
shipboard activities. Surely, Congress did not intend to promote uniform
coverage under the Amendments in this manner.
Closely related to the traditional work of longshoremen - loading and
unloading vessels - are the relatively new tasks of "stripping," unpacking
cargo containers 1 35 after they have been removed intact from a vessel, and
"stuffing," packing containers prior to their loading aboard a vessel. Legislative history evidences congressional concern about the effects of modern
cargo handling techniques, especially containerization, on the nature of longshoremen's work. 36 A primary congressional motive behind the landward
extension was to accommodate the Act to these changes. 37 Accordingly, the
Second Circuit held that all persons "who are engaged in stripping and
stuffing containers" are engaged in maritime employment regardless of whether
they satisfy the shipboard duties proviso required of cargo handlers.13 S In
131. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4735.
132. Id. at 4736. The Second Circuit had recognized in Pittston that "[a] 'longshoreman'
may . . .be covered at some times even when he is not engaged in traditional longshoring
activity." 544 F.2d at 52. That. circuit apparently believes that the amended Act created a
status requirement rather than an incident test. Professor Larson refers to the Fifth
Circuit's time of injury holding as a "serious blunder." See 4 A. LARSON, supra note 20, §89.42.
133. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4735.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. "Containers are rectangular metal structures used to transport cargo. After being
taken off the vessel by crane, they are provided with a chassis and wheels and converted into
large box trailers capable of being trailed on the highways by tractors." Stockman v. John
T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F.2d at 265 n.l.
136. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, supra note 38, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE & CONG. AD.
NEWS 4207-08. For a discussion on the changes brought about by modem cargo handling
techniques, see Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, 5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 507 (1974).
137. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d at 53; Stockman v. John T.
Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F.2d at 275.
138. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d at 56.
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Stockman the First Circuit followed Judge Friendly's lead and upheld an
award to a worker injured while unloading a container previously dis9
charged from a vessel.1
Although recognizing that the First and Second Circuits had extended
coverage to all employees stuffing and stripping containers, the Third Circuit
in Sea-Land Service Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (Suarez) 140 nevertheless concluded that a greater nexus was required.
The Suarez court reviewed the award to a claimant who had injured his
hand while stripping a container at rest within a terminal building. Relying
on invalid factual distinctions, the court refused to adopt what they called
the "fairly narrow" holdings of the First and Second Circuits,' 4 ' and instead
remanded for evidence as to whether the stripping met that court's functional relationship test.
The Supreme Court in Northeast Marine, recognizing that "the container
is a modern substitute for the hold of the vessel,"' 142 upheld the Second
Circuit's ruling that claimant Blundo, injured while checking cargo being
stripped from a container, satisfied the status requirement because he was
performing the "functional equivalent of sorting cargo discharged from a
ship." 43 Since no valid factual distinctions can be drawn between the Northeast Marine and Suarez container stripping cases the Supreme Court has
effectively overruled the functional relationship test as applied to cargo
handlers.
In addition to coverage for longshoremen, the Act expressly provides
coverage for harbor workers such as ship repairmen, ship builders, and ship
breakers. Thus far the only problem encountered pertaining to these workers
is determining at what point the shipbuilding process begins. Applying its
functional relationship test in Dravo Corp. v. Maxim, 4 the Third Circuit
denied a petition for review of the Board's decision that a claimant, injured
while burning steel plates for later use on barge decks and bottoms, satisfied
the status test. The court ruled that the relationship of the claimant steel
fabricator's activity to the defendant's shipbuilding operation was maritime
in character, rejecting the argument that the Act's coverage extended only to

139. 539 F.2d at 276-77.
140. 552 F.2d 985 (Sd Cir. 1977).
141. Id. at 995 n.18a. The court distinguished Stockman and Pittston on three grounds:
(1) in Pittston the injuries occurred on the pier, (2) "the claimants had frequent occasion
to actually perform a substantial part of their duties aboard the vessel," and (3) in Stockman "the parties stipulated that the claimant was a 'longshoreman' who worked on the
docks." Id. As to the first basis, since the injury took place within the terminal it certainly
met any situs requirement, especially in the Third Circuit, which claims to have none.
The second basis for the distinction is inapplicable to container stuffers and strippers since
the Second Circuit applied its "shipboard" proviso only to other cargo handlers. Finally,
while the parties had stipulated that Stockman was employed as a longshoreman, the
question remained whether in fact his activities met the status requirements.
142. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4785.

143. Id.
144. 545 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1976).
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shipbuilding at the final shoreside point of rest for a vessel under construction.145

The Fifth Circuit reached the same result in Perdue upon review of an
award to a worker, Nulty, injured at a fabrication shop while building a
piece of woodwork to be installed on a new ship.146 The court concluded
that Nulty was "directly involved in an ongoing shipbuilding operation" and

148
therefore covered. 147 Subsequently, in Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Morgan,
the Fifth Circuit applied its "ongoing shipbuilding" test to a shipfitter helper
apprentice crushed to death while cleaning a steel plate in preparation for
its use in fabrication.149 In upholding the award the court rejected Ingalls'
arguments that the facts were distinguishable from those of Nulty. First,
although Morgan was cleaning steel rather than constructing a part for the
vessel, the court considered the cleaning a "necessary prerequisite to fabrication."'15° Nor was it significant that the plate was intended for use on a ship
not yet launched. And, since a launched ship was not a prerequisite, it followed
that shipbuilders were not required to have spent time working on board
a ship.1" 1

CONCLUSION

The history of the Act demonstrates the difficulty inherent in promoting
fairness and uniformity of coverage while preserving the simplicity in application fundamental to workmen's compensation programs. Certainty in the
coverage provision was necessarily forfeited when Congress moved the
boundary from the shoreline onto the land. While certainty is indeed a desirable goal in any workmen's compensation program, Congress has placed a
higher premium on the establishment of a uniform system of compensation.
The courts should honor this intention, and most have done so.
The Supreme Court, by taking a liberal approach to the situs requirement,
especially in its coverage of workers injured in any part of an active marine
terminal, has avoided many problems that were beginning to arise under the
situs test. Future problems could be avoided by not applying the "customarily
used" requirement to "terminals" as that term has been defined by the
Court. 52 Following the Court's rejection of the point of rest doctrine,
future litigation will probably be directed toward the Second Circuit's proviso
requiring that a longshoreman-claimant "spen[d] a significant part of his
' 53
time in the typical longshoring activity of taking cargo on or off a vessel"'
to qualify for coverage. Because this proviso defeats the principal goals of
145. Id. at 379-80.
146. 539 F.2d at 543-44.
147. Id. See also Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co. v. Kininess, 554 F.2d 176 (5th
Cir. 1977) (shipbuilder injured while sandblasting a dissembled crane prior to the crane's
use in shipbuilding activities found to be covered).
148. 551 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1977).
149. Id. at 64.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See text accompanying notes 86-88 supra.
153. See text accompanying notes 124-130 supra.
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